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Note
Bleeding Out: The Case for Strengthening
Healthcare Client Portal Data Privacy
Regulations
Matthew D. McCord*
On a cool, May Friday in Long Beach, California, one of the
largest managed healthcare companies in the United States
abruptly yanked its patient portal system out of production.1
Molina Healthcare (“Molina”) pulled its key customer-facing
system because of a dangerous set of application security faults
lurking in the code after a security researcher reported an
anonymous tip.2 The application reportedly failed to
authenticate patients against their claims and passed claim IDs
through plain, user-modifiable URL text, allowing any user to
view any other claim just by changing the URL.3 The data
compromised included individualized, valuable, and closelyguarded protected health information (PHI), including patient
names, addresses, dates of birth, diagnoses, and prescriptions
among other data points and descriptors, opening patients to
damaging leaks of their private health and to medical fraud.4

© 2019 Matthew D. McCord
JD Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Jessica Davis, Molina Healthcare Breached, Exposed Patient Data for
Over a Month, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (May 30, 2017), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/molina-healthcare-breached-exposed-patient-data-over-month
(describing the security breach that occurred at Molina Healthcare, a company
that provides health care services to low-income families and individuals). For
information on Molina’s size and headquarters location, see Molina Healthcare,
FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/molina-healthcare/ (last visited
Dec. 3, 2017). For information on local weather on the date of the incident response, see Weather History for Long Beach, CA, WEATHER UNDERGROUND,
https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KLGB/2017/5/26/DailyHistory.html?req_city=&req_state=&req_statename=&reqdb.zip=&reqdb.magic=&reqdb.wmo= (last visited Dec. 3, 2017).
2. Davis, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
*
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Yet, the data contained in insurer portals can pale in comparison
to the extensive data held by and across particular healthcare
providers (e.g. one’s primary doctor or cardiologist).5 While
insurer data may include generalized data about claims,
provider portals can contain compendiums of full lab results,
summaries of care, patient concerns, practitioner impressions,
personal and relatives’ contact information, and billing data.6
While Molina quickly stated that it was in the “process of
conducting an internal investigation to determine the impact” of
the breach, and that “protecting [its] members’ information is of
utmost importance[,]” the researcher behind the revelation,
Brian Krebs, remained unnerved.7 Mr. Krebs stated that it was
“unconscionable that such a basic, Security 101 flaw could still
exist at a major healthcare provider today,” yet notes that these
“serious vulnerabilities” are far from disparate events, but are
rather common and pressing problems in the United States’
national health and cybersecurity infrastructure.8
5. See
What
is
a
Patient
Portal?,
HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/faqs/what-patient-portal (last
visited Dec. 3, 2017) (finding that the most comprehensive portals have
virtualized office visits, secure provider-to-patient messaging, benefits and
coverage information, financial and billing information, relatives’ medical
summaries, and comprehensive medical histories stored on or, at a minimum,
processed through their servers); see, e.g., Blue Cross Online Visits, BLUE CROSS
BLUE SHIELD OF MICH., https://www.bcbsm.com/index/find-a-doctor/onlinevisits.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
6. See What is a Patient Portal?, supra note 5 (concluding that billing data
includes financially sensitive data like credit card numbers, insurance group
and member numbers, prescription billing information, bank account numbers,
and other information used to pay and validate payment between patients,
providers, and payers).
7. Davis, supra note 1.
8. See id. The flaw itself was exposure of a “GET” request, reflecting this
“basic, Security 101” error that was “unconscionable” in its existence. This
reflection, by industry standards, sounds largely in truth and common sense.
See, e.g., Kevin Beaver, Why Use POST vs. GET to Keep Applications Secure,
TECHTARGET
(Feb.
2010),
http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/tip/Why-use-POST-vs-GET-tokeep-applications-secure (finding that businesses should avoid using GET
requests at all costs); Paris Mitton, Never Put Secrets in URLs and Query
Parameters,
FULLCONTACT
(Apr.
2016),
https://www.fullcontact.com/blog/never-put-secrets-urls-query-parameters/
(finding that URLs and query parameters aren’t secure). Indeed, the datapassing flaw and subsequent failure-to-authenticate flaw are both listed in the
Open Web Application Security Project’s database as common vulnerabilities,
with the authentication failure cited as one of the ten most critical application
security risks. OPEN WEB APPLICATION SEC. PROJECT, OWASP TOP 10 – 2017:
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Cybersecurity has loudly slammed the world of healthcare
in recent years, with the severity and frequency of attacks on the
national healthcare infrastructure attracting the noticeable
scrutiny of the federal government.9 Healthcare has become a
substantially attractive cyberattack vector with the advent of
the Internet of Things and its spread into life-critical systems
like insulin pumps, increased device interconnectedness, rapidly
spreading digitization, and increasing public demand for and
activation of open access vectors for patients to view their
information.10
The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risk , 12 (2017),
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10-2017_Top_10 (denoting as a critical
application vulnerability the uncontrolled, i.e. unchecked, access to sensitive
web application data layers and systems through improper validation and
control of POST requests, the alternative, more secure, web application request
type to GET, as occurred in this particular case); Data Validation, OPEN WEB
SEC. APPLICATION PROJECT, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Data_Validation
(last modified Dec. 1, 2013) (“strongly discourag[ing] . . . GET request” protocols
for sending data except for navigational purposes). Yet, these vulnerabilities
are seen, despite clear industry standards being set, repeatedly in notes on
vulnerabilities in all manner of applications. See, e.g., CVE-2017-6086, NAT’L
VULNERABILITY
DATABASE,
https://cve.mitre.org/cgibin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-6086 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); NVD - CVE2017-12212,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
STANDARDS
AND
TECH.,
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12212 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
9. HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, REPORT ON
IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 5 (June 2017)
(discussing and developing recommendations on the growing challenge of cyber
attacks targeting health care).
10. Id. at 10. For a discussion of the extensive cybersecurity concerns with
medical devices, see generally John G. Browning & Shawn Tuma, If Your Heart
Skips a Beat, It May Have Been Hacked: Cybersecurity Concerns with Implanted
Medical Devices, 67 S.C. L. REV. 637 (2016) (finding that there is panic over
hackable pacemakers, for example, which reflects cybersecurity concerns
grounded in realism, with unconscionable consequences of failures and
shortcomings). As patient portals often store medical records of patients,
including their prescription records, care summaries, and present conditions,
data on which medical professionals rely in making treatment decisions, a
carefully-constructed attack on a patient record system could foreseeably lead
to similarly austere harms as those posited by RFID pacemakers and similar
medical devices. See What is a Patient Portal?, supra note 5 (describing the
kinds of records that can be processed and contained on patient portals); Shahid
Mansuri, How Patient Portals are Improving the Virtual Healthcare System,
VALIDIC (Jan. 4, 2018), https://validic.com/how-patient-portals-are-improvingthe-virtual-healthcare-system/ (discussing and analyzing how the adoption of
patient portals have integrated this particular bit of technology with the active
medical practices and decisions of a broad swathe of medical professionals,
especially in on-demand care, as the march toward medical efficiency
continues); Patient Portal Benefits Patient Care and Provider Workflow,
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This Note seeks to examine the field of cybersecurity as it
intersects with healthcare through an examination of the
security of provider and insurer portals and the data contained
on them, describe the security concerns flowing out of health
information digitization, and provide for remediation of these
concerns in an increasingly digital and increasingly digitallybesieged world. Part I will cover relevant background
information on patient portals generally, the scope and value of
health records stored on these portals, the rapidly-increasing
vectors for digital attacks on national healthcare infrastructure,
the evolution of distributed application security generally, the
statutory schemes for regulating health portal data, and
findings of liability for health data breaches. Part II will explore
the ways in which proper healthcare portal data security
furthers the national interest and the adequacy of the current
and proposed statutory scheme’s coverage of portal data. Part III
will describe ways to create proper healthcare data security
across the industry through a proposed legislative framework to
address the continually-evolving challenges of healthcare IT.
The Note will then conclude by stating that the hazards of
insecurity discussed threaten national security, and the
technology surrounding health data portals should reflect that
risk through a comprehensive and enforceable but flexible
statutory framework designed to supersede the present
piecemeal approach to data security in the sector.
I.

BACKGROUND

This background section will introduce the relevant
historical background and recent developments pertaining to
patient healthcare portals, including insurance claim and
customer databases and provider servicing applications. This
part will include a discussion of breaches at health providers and
health insurers inclusive of physical plant breaches. This part
will also discuss the vast increase in vectors for obtaining
healthcare information and thus vectors for attack, with
particular focus on web portals and the rise of state actors and
HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/case-study/patient-portal-benefitspatient-care-and-provider-workflow (last reviewed Sept. 19, 2017) (describing a
government industry information release using the case study of a Primary
Health Medical Group in Idaho to relay a similar message as Mr. Mansuri in
relation to the benefits and contingent reliance of medical professionals on
patient portals).
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powerful, well-resourced groups hijacking information in recent
years. This discussion ends by introducing the hodgepodge
regulatory and statutory framework for healthcare data
protection and the bases for liability to which healthcare
businesses may expose themselves due to inadequate data
protection policies.
A. HISTORY OF PATIENT PORTALS
A patient portal, per the U.S. government, is “a secure
online website that gives patients convenient[,] 24-hour access
to personal health information from anywhere[.]”11 Online
medical portals entered rapid adoption in 2011 as part of the
Meaningful Use technology investment program incorporated in
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act of 2009.12 The HITECH Act allocated
$19.2 billion to fund health information technology development,
with expenditures guided by the Meaningful Use program
requirements.13
Specifically, the Meaningful Use requirements provided a
carrot-and-stick approach to enforcing adoption among Medicare
and Medicaid servicing providers.14 With HITECH foreseeing a
problem of then-low health information technology provider
adoption rates due to the high implementation costs of these
11. See What is a Patient Portal?, supra note 5. As briefly discussed in that
note and accompanying sources, health portals can range from a “barebones”
summary of care received or appointment scheduling interface to a one-stop,
unified records, access, care, and financial system spanning entire
amalgamated care and hospital networks as these systems deign to provide
maximal efficiency and unified user experience/single location benefits for
providers, patients, and payers; see also Mansuri, supra note 10 (explaining the
developments made in patient portal technology).
12. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1115, § 3001, 123 Stat. 115, 231 (Feb. 17, 2009) (containing HITECH after
consolidation of the bills in question); Terese Otte-Trojel et al., Characteristics
of Patient Portals Developed in the Context of Health Information Exchanges:
Early Policy Effects of Incentives in the Meaningful Use Program in the United
States, J. MED. INTERNET RES., Nov. 21, 2014, at e258-1, 2 (finding that
HITECH included USD 30 billion for accelerating and mainstreaming the use
of health information technology).
13. CHRISTINE PETERSON, HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGES AND
PATIENT PORTALS IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 7 (2015).
14. See Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing
Adoption of Electronic Health Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH
L. REV. 43, 50 (2011) (finding that Medicaid and Medicare incentive payments
will be made to doctors).

288

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 20:

systems, the Act provided subsidies for implementation of
substantial electronic health record (EHR) systems, which
include the functionality offered by patient portals as integrated
EHR systems.15 The incentive program ran its five-year course
in 2016, and the incentives became penalties to participating
providers, with hospitals failing to use EHR systems for
“meaningful purposes” docked one to five percent per year of
their Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement payments.16
This spring of grant finances, the threat of Medicare
penalties, and the business logic in moving toward online
storage of patient information rapidly shifted many providers
away from paper-centric information management and toward
digital record solutions.17 Adopting patient portals can provide
for the more efficient practice of medicine and can enhance the
quality of care patients receive, enabling remote interactions to
better use physician and patient time if adopted properly.18 In

15. See 42 C.F.R. § 495.102(b) (Oct. 1, 2017) (containing detailed provisions
regarding incentive amounts); see also Terry, supra note 14 (finding that a
physician participating in the full five-year incentive program “could receive the
maximum subsidy of $44,000 through Medicare” if not employed through their
hospital; hospital systems are eligible for a $2 million baseline, with additional
monies disbursed based on a formula regarding inpatient discharges).
16. See 42 C.F.R. § 495.102(d) (Oct. 1, 2017); Terry, supra note 14
(discussing that starting in 2016, HITECH’s “carrots” will be replaced by
“sticks”); AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, Meaningful Use Adjustments, 2 HEALTH
L. PRAC. GUIDE § 25:37 (2017) (“Beginning in 2015, CMS will negatively adjust
the reimbursement of physicians and certain other eligible professionals who
do not meet the ‘meaningful use’ criteria related to their use of EHRs.”).
17. See Kristine Crane, How Patient Portals are Changing Health Care,
U.S.
NEWS
AND
WORLD
REPORT
(June
30,
2014),
https://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2014/06/30/howpatient-portals-are-changing-health-care (discussing the general shift of
medicine to online service delivery and its consumer use case, namely doing
away with physically-encumbering paper files and providing for speed and ease
of communication between patient-consumer and physician, as well as singlepractice numbers in a portal-implementing provider setting indicating an
adoption rate of roughly three-quarters). Patient portals have been heavily
advocated in the business context of healthcare service delivery due to consumer
demand and efficiency pressures. See, e.g., Heather Landi, The Business Case
for Increasing Patient Portal Adoption, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Jan. 7,
2016),
https://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/business-caseincreasing-patient-portal-adoption; Elizabeth W. Woodcock, How Patient
Portals Create Value for Patients—and Fulfill Meaningful Use Requirements,
http://www.medfusion.net/docs/Patient%20Portals%20MU%20white%20paper.
pdf. (retrieved Dec. 1, 2017).
18. See generally Daniel F. Shay, A Window Into Patient Portals: Legal and
Practical Issues for Physician Practices, 2017 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK 13 (May
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the long term, efficiencies brought about through digital
innovation can lower costs for patients and insurers, decreasing
the financial burden of administrative overhead on the
healthcare delivery system.19
Patient portal adoption also gathered steam as part of the
wider consumer information access movement.20 The increasing
rate of digitization has increased the power of the consumer and
the competition for consumers’ time and money.21 Consumers,
generally, have come to desire easy, on-demand access to their
care records.22 Similarly, consumers wish to have transparent
access to their health plan’s claims information.23 As a result,
insurers, like providers, have implemented patient portals with
virtual unanimity to provide consumer access to the information
they demand.24
B. SCOPE AND VALUE OF HEALTH RECORDS
Health records are an intrinsically ubiquitous and valuable
set of data, leaving their owners vulnerable to multiple frauds,
thefts, and other unpleasantries if left exposed.25 Health records
2017) (discussing the advantages of using mobile phones and applications to
access patient care).
19. See id.; see also Mansuri, supra note 10 and accompanying text
(discussing the combination of public and private economic efficiency, demandbased, and grant incentives resulting in shifting the market balance heavily
toward the adoption of full-service patient portal suites); Otte-Trojel, supra note
12, at 2 (noting that The Meaningful Use requirement “stick” all but ensured
near-total adoption of patient portals in satisfaction of the EHR requirements);
What Physicians Need to Know About Patient Portals, AMA WIRE (July 7, 2015),
https://wire.ama-assn.org/practice-management/what-physicians-need-knowabout-patient-portals (“Patients are used to accessing information online
immediately, from checking their bank balance to booking travel. Physicians
can tap into this expectation using patient portals.”).
20. See generally William B. Lober & Janine L. Flowers, Consumer
Empowerment in Health Care Amid the Internet and Social Media, 27
SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY NURSING 169, 174 (2011) (discussing how social trends
are visible in the integration of information and communication technologies
into health care, in both searching for and sharing information on the internet).
21. See id. at 170.
22. See id. at 176.
23. See Rick Krohn, The Consumer-Centric Personal Health Record—It’s
Time, J. HEALTHCARE INFO. MGMT., Feb. 2007, at 20–21 (finding that “[w]hile
surveys confirm that most of the general population is unaware of PHR systems,
they also reveal consumer and patient interest in their potential value”).
24. Id. at 21.
25. See Caroline Hunter & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth More
to Hackers Than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014),
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have long been recognized as vulnerable, valuable targets worth
ten to twenty times that of a stolen credit card number.26 Data
stolen from health records includes personally identifiable
information (PII) and PHI, with names, diagnoses, payer IDs,
financial information, summaries of care, contact information,
and dates of birth potentially compromised in a breach of such a
record.27
This valuable data is most commonly used in insurance
fraud because of its difficult-to-audit nature compared to other
financial frauds.28 A thief can abscond with one’s insurance
name, date of birth, enrollee number, and group number, and, in
theory, run huge bills against their victims—the insurer and the
enrollee, purchasing and reselling, or using themselves, medical
equipment and drugs.29 Such an actor can also falsify provider
numbers and file bogus claims against the insurer.30 This sort of
fraud has increased exponentially as technology has developed,
though most anti-fraud efforts on the part of government and
insurers remain focused on fraudulent provider billing
practices.31 Often, the first sign of this fraud to a patient is not a
strange line item from the credit card company or a call from a
biller, but a months-out call from a medical collections agent,
unordered service line items in the oft-discarded and unread
payer Explanation of Benefits notices, or some other form of
notice from the health insurer.32 Cases of medical identity theft
cost the average victim around $13,500 to fix, with an estimated
2.32 million victims.33 The total cost to the economy for medical
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals/your-medicalrecord-is-worth-more-to-hackers-than-your-credit-cardidUSKCN0HJ21I20140924 (“Security experts say cyber criminals are
increasingly targeting the $3 trillion U.S. healthcare industry.”).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT (Aug. 2012),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0171-medical-identity-theft (discussing
ways to report and recover from medical identity theft).
29. Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28.
33. See Dan Munro, New Study Says Over 2 Million Americans Are Victims
of
Medical
Identity
Theft,
FORBES
(Feb.
23,
2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/02/23/new-study-says-over-2million-americans-are-victims-of-medical-identity-theft/#470344ee15a0;
see
also Kelli B. Grant, How to Protect Yourself From Medical Identity Theft, CNBC
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identity theft was estimated at $41.3 billion in 2012, or around
1.5% of 2010 total medical spending in the United States.34
Health data can be and is used for more classic forms of
identity theft, due to the trove of information a patient record
can represent.35 The health sector had a plurality, in comparison
to all other major sectors of domestic economic activity, of total
incidents of identity theft reported in one report.36 The data
stolen from healthcare providers did not solely include patient
PHI: other lost data includes PII, financial, payment, and
authentication data.37 Leaked PII and payment information are
used to run fraudulent charges against the victim’s credit cards,
open new lines of credit in the victim’s name, file false tax
returns, assume the victim’s credentials to gain access, sell the
victim’s data to others who can engage in frauds, and undertake
other activities in the victim’s name.38 If the PII or PHI leaked
includes the victim’s relative’s name or other personal
information, data criminals can use that data to force their way
into the victim’s accounts through deriving answers to security
questions, such as his mother’s maiden name, his first child’s
name, last four digits of his social security number, or other
identity verification queries that can be derived in such a
fashion.39

(Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/08/how-to-protect-yourselffrom-medical-identity-theft.html.
34. See Michelle Andrews, The Rise of Medical Identity Theft, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/medical-identitytheft/medical-identity-theft/; see also Health Care Costs: A Primer, KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION (May 1, 2012), https://www.kff.org/report-section/healthcare-costs-a-primer-2012-report/ (discussing U.S. healthcare spending as a
portion of the economy generally).
35. See NUMAAN HUQ, FOLLOW THE DATA: DISSECTING DATA BREACHES
AND DEBUNKING MYTHS 13
(2015), https://www.trendmicro.de/cloudcontent/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-follow-the-data.pdf
(finding that hackers use health data to “gain access to resources or services,
apply for credit cards or loans, register fake accounts, file fraudulent tax returns
to collect rebates, and other activities without the victim’s knowledge or
consent.”).
36. See id. (finding that the healthcare sector was most affected by data
breaches, followed by the government and retail sectors).
37. See id. at 14.
38. Id. at 13, 22.
39. For a discussion of the possibilities of derivative identity theft like the
hypothetical posed in the accompanying text, see Mike Timmermann, Why You
Should Change All of Your Security Question Answers Right Now, CLARK (Oct.
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Health record loss threatens the integrity of one’s person at
the most extreme end of data-enabled personal information
disclosure.40 Breach of protected health records poses a threat to
one’s person in two primary ways: first, the classical safety risks
of release of PII; second, release or compromise of a patient’s
PHI, and the consequences such exposure brings. The first
threat resembles the classic dangers of PII release, or “doxxing,”
in online parlance.41 Releasing a person’s name and home or job
address renders them targets for cyberbullying, stalking, and
extortion.42 One of the more extreme examples of threats to the
person extending from PII release is “swatting,” a form of
extreme harassment where a false emergency is reported at the
victim’s home or office and an often fully-armed police response
follows.43 Victims may then be surprised at gunpoint, as in the
case of California state senator Ted Lieu in 2013.44 This
harassment may result in the injury or death of the victim.45
Release of PII obtained from health portals carries as much risk

6,
2017),
http://clark.com/consumer-issues-id-theft/security-questionschallenge-answers-hackers-why-you-should-change/.
40. See Huq, supra note 36, at 13 (showing healthcare industry to have the
most breaches of any industry); Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26 (discussing
value of health information). See supra sections I.A and I.B for a discussion of
the large amount and variety of personal and identifiable information stored
with medical providers through EHR and patient portal systems.
41. See Anneliese Mahoney, Doxxing and Swatting: New Frontiers in
Online
Harassment,
LAW
STREET
(May
8,
2017),
https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/technology/doxxing-swatting-onlineharassment/ (explaining that “doxxing,” from the word “document,” is the
release of personal information).
42. See id.; see also Ana Dascalescu, Doxxing Can Ruin Your Life. Here’s
How (You Can Avoid It), HEIMDAL SECURITY (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/doxxing/#doxxingnudes
(noting
various
instances of doxxing).
43. See Mahoney, supra note 41.
44. See id.; Patrick McGreevy, Senator with Anti-Swatting Bill is Victim of
Hoax
Emergency
Call,
L.A.TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/19/local/la-me-pc-senator-swatting20130419 (recounting how a hoax text message prompted an armed police
response to a purported shooting at the Senator’s home).
45. For example, after a false report of a hostage situation, armed police
shot a victim of swatting with rubber bullets, resulting in broken bones and
bruising. See Ben Kentish, British Man Charged After US Gamer is Shot by
Swat Police Following Hoax Terrorism Call, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/robert-mcdaid-chargedtyran-dobbs-swatting-hoax-call-swat-terrorism-maryland-shot-gun-explosivesa7677071.html.
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of crimes against the person as release of PII from any other
source.46
The second threat against the person that results from a
release or compromise of health records specifically involves
sensitive PHI. PHI can be used as a mode of blackmail and
extortion.47 Medical records include sensitive information, like
diagnoses of psychological conditions, sexually transmitted
diseases, cancer, and other compromising information.48 Release
of this information can at the least cause embarrassment, and
at the worst feed character assassination of more public
persons.49 If a patient portal system were sufficiently
compromised and an actor had particularly bad intent, these
systems could be used to directly harm a person in the medical
context as well.50 For example, a bad actor with access to a
targeted patient’s medical condition, prescription, and care
records could edit those records to reflect the information they
wanted to see. Physicians rely on the accuracy of their electronic
health records of their patients to prescribe medication and
undertake courses of treatment.51 A bad actor could, in theory,
edit that record, misleading a physician to undertake a course of
treatment that could seriously harm a patient because of the
compromised data’s inaccuracy.52

46. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 3536 at 13; Personally Identifiable
Information:
HIPAA
Best
Practices,
VIRTRU
(May
20,
2016),
https://www.virtru.com/blog/personally-identifiable-information-hipaa/.
47. Mariya Yao, Your Electronic Medical Records Could Be Worth $1000 To
Hackers,
FORBES
(Apr.
14,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariyayao/2017/04/14/your-electronic-medicalrecords-can-be-worth-1000-to-hackers/#584686e350cf.
48. Id.
49. Id. Yao discusses use of falsified PHI to suggest Hillary Clinton was not
physically able to hold office, thus potentially undermining her presidential bid
in 2016. Id.; see also Robert Farley, Fake Clinton Medical Records,
FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.factcheck.org/2016/08/fakeclinton-medical-records/.
50. Clarke & Youngstein, Cyberattack on Britain’s National Health Service
— A Wake-Up Call for Modern Medicine, NEW ENG. J. OF MED., Aug. 3, 2017, at
411.
51. See discussion supra note 10 and accompanying text.
52. This is far from the realm of speculative science fiction. See the
discussion of medical device hackability concerns and the transferability of
those harms in principle to patient portals, which play a similarly crucial role
in patient care, supra note 10.
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C. PRIMER ON DISTRIBUTED APPLICATION SECURITY METHODS
Distributed application security measures form a
constantly-evolving component of information security.53 A
variety of methods exist to strengthen applications in the face of
attack, many of which are balanced on a cost-benefit analysis of
their implementation in specific applications, as well as on the
competency of a particular development team.54 In the present
technological environment, the most notable and widelyimplemented method of securing application communications is
in-transit encryption, commonly over the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) protocol.55 SSL is a silent-running method of application
security which encrypts communications when they are in
transit between a client’s computer and a provider’s server,
effectively preventing data eavesdroppers from unscrambling
that data and leeching off the unguarded information—which
may include PHI and PII.56 Without SSL encryption, an attacker
could listen in on communications between the provider’s server
and the patient’s machine, enabling her to siphon off all kinds of
personal data.57 SSL is one of the few specific federal
cybersecurity regulatory requirements presently in effect.58 For
example, the U.S. Department of Defense is required to use SSL
to store protected information.59
Another primary form of data security is the encryption of
data on the server itself through hardware and software. This

53. See generally J.M. Olejarz, The Evolving Cyberthreat, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov. 2015, at 150, 151 (arguing that a more dynamic security strategy sharing
platform is necessary to keep up with equally dynamic cyberthreats).
54. See generally Mohammad S. Jalali & Jessica P. Kaiser, Cybersecurity
in Hospitals: A Systematic, Organizational Perspective, J. MED. INTERNET RES.,
May
8,
2018,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5996174/
(discussing how hospitals decide what cybersecurity measures to pursue).
55. See id.; see also Everything You Need to Know About SSL Certificates,
VERISIGN,
https://www.verisign.com/en_US/website-presence/websiteoptimization/ssl-certificates/index.xhtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). SSL
presence is often indicated by a “lock” indicator in many internet browsers.
56. See id.
57. See id. (describing SSL as enabling a “private conversation just between
the two intended parties”).
58. See KATE CHARLET, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY 6 (2018) (noting that
federal agencies are required to develop and report generally on cybersecurity
measures). There is no mention of specific programs or technologies required by
the federal government; see also id.
59. 32 C.F.R. § 505.2(c)(3) (2019).
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type of encryption scrambles the data so that someone with
access to the provider’s server cannot arbitrarily gain access to
the data stored on it.60 For web applications, decryption (for data
presented to the user) and encryption (for data submitted by the
user or provider to or through the application) may be handled
on the “front end” (i.e., decrypted or encrypted on the user’s
machine) or the “back end” (where operations are handled on the
server and the results presented through an encrypted SSL
pipe).61
Additional measures exist for securing web-based
applications that are of particular relevance to PHI-sensitive
uses.62 Multi-factor authentication requires the end user to use
another method, other than their username and password, to log
in to a computer or site.63 User role authentication and control
prevents users from accessing data that is not theirs, editing
data which they should not be editing, or gaining privileges they
should not have.64 This kind of authentication could have
prevented the sort of breach Molina experienced.65 Another
method—enforcing updates to system and application software,
or “patching”—is often deployed to close known security
vulnerabilities,66 a commonly-touted best practice that the

60. See Caroline Sanders Reach, Client Data in the Cloud, 28 CHI. B. ASS’N
REC. 44, 49 (2014).
61. See generally Eric Limer, Mega’s Clever Encryption Will Protect You,
But
Mostly
Kim
Dotcom,
GIZMODO
(Jan.
19,
2013),
https://gizmodo.com/5977265/how-megas-encryption-will-protect-you-butmostly-kim-dotcom.
62. See generally ORACLE, HITECH’S CHALLENGE TO THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY (2011), https://www.oracle.com/assets/owp-security-hipaa-hitech522515.pdf.
63. See Info. Tech. Lab., Back to Basics: Multi-Factor Authentication
(MFA), NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.nist.gov/itl/tig/back-basics-multi-factor-authentication. This sort
of authentication most commonly includes a mobile phone app response or entry
of a code sent via text message, but can include facial recognition, smartcards,
biometrics, and other forms of authentication. See id. An attacker thus would
not be able to access someone’s portal account merely with their password but
would have the added challenge of taking whatever device acts as the second
authenticator, or cracking a second-factor biometric. See id.
64. See Azure Data Security and Encryption Best Practices, MICROSOFT
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/azure-securitydata-encryption-best-practices.
65. See generally id.; see also Davis, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
66. See Dan Goldberg & Addy Baird, As Cyber Attacks Rise, Hospitals Seek
to
Protect
Medical
Records,
POLITICO
(Apr.
14,
2016),
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healthcare industry in particular rarely follows.67 Training users
on system use and compliance, in addition to in-built data
validation, can prevent potentially catastrophic user errors.68
Out-of-date software, which many hospitals and clinics may
use,69 contains vulnerabilities which are often patched on newer
releases; these (undefended because of legacy software)
vulnerabilities are known to attackers, who can make an easy
grab for information.70 Thus, the medical sector is an easier
target for information criminals.71 Ensuring that software is
regularly updated would go far in protecting hospitals and
clinics from these simple attacks.72
D. EVOLUTION OF DATA SECURITY AND HEALTHCARE DATA
STATUTES
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)73 forms the cornerstone of the current healthcare

https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/04/as-cyberattacks-rise-hospitals-seek-to-protect-medical-records-067223.
67. See Mike Schrock, Unpatched Software Vulnerabilities a Growing
Problem, OPSWAT (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.opswat.com/blog/unpatchedsoftware-vulnerabilities-growing-problem (noting that 44% of breaches in 2014
exploited vulnerabilities that could have been patched via software updates two
to four years prior); Steve Manzuik, How Hospitals Are Getting Hacked and
How to Prevent It From Happening To You, HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (May 26,
2016),
https://www.healthitoutcomes.com/doc/how-hospitals-are-gettinghacked-and-how-to-prevent-it-from-happening-to-you-0001 (listing outdated
software and hardware as the major vulnerabilities in hospital cybersecurity).
68. See generally Goldberg & Baird, supra note 66.
69. Software often goes unpatched or underpatched in medical contexts due
to a combination of lack of financial resources, dependence on software only
compatible with older versions of system software or other interdependent
programs, or a perceived lack of need to upgrade by key stakeholders. See, e.g.,
Manzuik, supra note 67; Damien Gayle et al., NHS Seeks to Recover from Global
Cyber-Attack as Security Concerns Resurface, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/may/12/hospitals-across-englandhit-by-large-scale-cyber-attack; Noel Towell & Aisha Dow, Obsolete, Outdated
Software puts Victorian Hospitals and Police at Risk of Cyber Attacks, THE AGE
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/obsoleteoutdated-software-puts-victorian-hospitals-and-police-at-risk-of-cyber-attacks20171129-gzv9ov.html.
70. See Manzuik, supra note 67.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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data regulatory scheme.74 HIPAA effectively acts as the health
sector catch-all statute, authorizing the promulgation of health
sector regulations for covered entities (i.e. insurers, billing
clearinghouses, and providers).75 HIPAA requires that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) and the
Attorney General issue guidelines to coordinate the
enforcement, investigation, and evaluation of health plans to
control fraud and abuse.76 In so doing, it protects the individual’s
privacy and information confidentiality throughout the course of
investigation.77 HIPAA’s information regulating muscle derives
from the Administrative Simplification part of the Act, which
sets out broad definitions of health information and requires the
Secretary to promulgate regulations and standards to safeguard
the security of health information and transactions.78 The Act
also provides for regulatory and criminal penalties for
noncompliance or knowing wrongful disclosure of “individually
identifiable health information[,]” while refusing to preempt
other causes of action that may arise out of such
misappropriation or noncompliance.79
The previously discussed HITECH Act, enacted as part of
the wider American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009,
established an Office of the National Coordinator for health
information technology and created a grant program to advance

74. See Aaron P. Sohaski & Jordan B. Segal, Litigation in a HITECH
World, 95 MICH. B.J. 52, 52 (Nov. 2016); see generally Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie
P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health
Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 683–84 (2007).
75. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No.
104–191, § 1172, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); see also Juliana Bell, Comment, Privacy
at Risk: Patients Use New Web Products to Store and Share Personal Health
Records, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 485, 488 (2009) (citing Deborah F. Buckman,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations
Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133 (2004). In essence, anyone in the
direct chain of data processing or use between patient and provider, though not
necessarily third parties outside that chain like fitness data amalgamators or
user-initiated application portals outside the provider-patient scheme, is
covered and must ensure the safety of patient data inside and outside the
facility. See Sohaski & Segal, supra note 74.
76. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No.
104–191, § 1128C(a)(3)(B), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320a–
7c).
77. See id.
78. See id. §§ 1172, 1173, 1175 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1–d-4).
79. Id. §§ 1176, 1177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5–6).
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“health care information enterprise integration[.]”80 HITECH
also established the aforementioned carrot-and-stick incentives
to shift providers to EHRs,81 created a policy committee
empowered to recommend national health infrastructure
developments,82 and created regional centers of excellence to
disseminate best practices to health organizations.83
HITECH’s substantive amendments to HIPAA came
through its Part D privacy modifications. HITECH requires
covered entities to implement policies and procedures to
“prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations[,]”
perform risk assessments, and implement sanction, risk
analysis, review, and disaster recovery policies.84 Further
requirements include the implementation of facility security
plans, sensitive information disposal plans, and access control
and authentication measures.85
HITECH further requires that a company subject to a data
breach notify the users impacted of the scope of the breach
within sixty days, with breaches involving more than 500
records to be reported to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (which the Department may then disclose as an
incident) unless law enforcement deems notification to be a
threat to national security or criminal investigations.86

80. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1115, Title 8, 123 Stat. 115, 179 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 19, 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11 (establishing Office of the National
Coordinator); 42 U.S.C. § 17912 (establishing grant program).
81. See Terry, supra note 14, at 46 and accompanying text.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-12(a) (2016).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-32(c)(1) (2009).
84. Id. at §§ 258, 260; 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2019).
85. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.310(a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iii), and (d)(2)(i) (2019).
86. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
13402, 123 Stat. 115, 261–62. Note that a breach is distinguishable from a
vulnerability in that a vulnerability involves a possibly exploitable security
fault in an application, whereas a breach is an actually-used vulnerability to
affect some end, most often malicious, such as stealing data. See generally
Sharon Durant, Types of Security Threats: The Differences Between a
Vulnerability, Threat and Breach?, DIGITAL WEST (May 19, 2015),
https://blog.digitalwest.com/blog/what-is-the-difference-between-a-securityvulnerability-threat-and-breach. As such, breach notification would not
necessarily come into play on discovery of a vulnerability that has not been
used; nonetheless, breach notifications may be sent if a party thinks it to be
reasonably prudent, especially if they have indication that there is some not
insubstantial chance that a vulnerability may have been exploited. Cf. 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.404 (2019) (“A covered entity shall . . . notify each individual whose
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Disclosures of PHI to carry out business operations are limited
by the Act to the “minimum necessary” data.87
The weight of HIPAA and HITECH’s regulatory text is
promulgated through HIPAA Omnibus Regulations.88 The
regulations provide for civil monetary penalties for breaches of
the Act’s regulations,89 allowed business uses for protected
health information,90 and rules relating to notification of
breaches to the public.91 The section of regulations pertaining
specifically to privacy and protection of electronic health
information and records specifically calls for “[f]lexibility of
approach,” enabling covered entities to use any “reasonabl[e]
and appropriate” security measures as long as they “ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability” of all EHRs, protect
against reasonable threats to that data’s security, and protect
against banned uses or disclosures of EHRs.92 This flexibility
comes with certain mandatory minimum standards designed to
enforce some sense of security competence on covered entities,
including a requirement for risk assessments, and
unsecured protected health information has been, or is reasonably believed by
the covered entity to have been accessed . . . as a result of such a breach.”)
(emphasis added).
87. § 13402, 123 Stat. at 265.
88. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.101 (2017) (describing the purpose of 45 C.F.R.
§ 160 in part as implementing HIPAA and HITECH). This regulation only
received its real enforcement and regulatory teeth from the 2009 HITECH Act
amending HIPAA. See Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting
Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 608–10 (2014). This particular set of regulations is
often called the Security Rule. Id. For more on the Security Rule, see Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and
Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1556 (2009).
89. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2019) (establishing a per-violation window of
$100 to $50,000, and an added penalty of not more than $1.5 million for
repeated, identical violations in the same year).
90. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2019). This regulation allows for disclosure,
e.g., to the individual, for purposes including treatment, operations, or
payment, and in compliance with the rest of the regulation, among other uses.
Id.
91. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2017) (requiring the notification to be in “plain
language,” describe the event and the types of information breached, steps
individuals should take to protect themselves, a description of what the entity
is doing to remediate the breach and provide free-of-charge contact information
for concerned customers). Section 164.406 requires notification of a large breach
(more than 500 residents of a State or other jurisdiction) to be disseminated to
the media and the Department of Health and Human Services within 60 days.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.406 (2019).
92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (2019).
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implementation of reasonable and appropriate safeguards
pursuant to the broader Privacy Rule.93
A proposed piece of legislation, the Improving Health
Information Technology Act, was a tabled piece of bipartisan
legislation in 2016 designed to address the shifting cybersecurity
concerns in the healthcare market.94 The legislation introduced
more concrete requirements on healthcare information
technology, including a ban on information blocking in
particular applications and a general requirement of unimpeded
and open access to consumer health information.95 The bill
provided for the creation of a partially-voluntary, standardized
rating system for health IT products drawing from providers, IT
professionals, patients, security and design experts,
manufacturers, and others.96 These ratings would evaluate
platform openness, security, usability, and conformity to
standards.97 Products receiving a one-star rating from an
independently-convened rating panel would be decertified, as
would products not reporting appropriate information to the
Department of Health and Human Services in a timely
manner.98 Product ratings would be available for public review
on the Department website.99 Decertification results in that
provider being exempted from Medicare’s Meaningful Use
Incentive program.100
II. ANALYSIS
This part discusses ways the present Acts, regulations, and
court holdings emphasize the importance of the principle of
healthcare record privacy through strong enforcement
provisions. It will then turn to an examination of how those laws
fail to provide for an adequate framework for disseminating,
93. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 608.
94. See S. 2511, 114th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions, 2016).
95. Id. § 3(a).
96. Id. § 3009A. Also of note is the section directing the Secretary to draw
from the expertise of NIST in developing these standards. See id.
97. See id. § 3009A(b)(4)(A) (listing categories of reporting criteria for
health information technology products).
98. Id. § 3009A(g)–(i).
99. Id. § 3009A(k).
100. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S.2511 IMPROVING HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ACT (2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senatebill/2511.

2019]

BLEEDING OUT

301

enforcing, and unifying healthcare record security best practices
as a component of personal and national security, exposing
resource-strapped or careless providers and insurers to
extensive potential liabilities.
A. HIPAA AND ITS HITECH AMENDMENTS LAY IMPORTANT
GROUNDWORK FOR DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY.
HIPAA and its amendments provide an important line of
protections for valuable health information.101 While the
piecemeal, sectoral approach to information security and privacy
results in an inconsistent patchwork of regulation across sectors,
HIPAA and HITECH create a somewhat powerful enforcement
regimen for the release of patient protected health information
and personally identifiable information, and are largely
successful at creating the statutory framework for a
comprehensive, sector-specific information governance baseline
regimen in the healthcare space.102
HIPAA derives its main enforcement power from the
promulgations of administrative procedures through the notice
and comment rule processes.103 Its broad definition of health
information and health care provider, health plan, and health
care clearinghouse appropriately includes most segments of the
healthcare services and delivery sector. This includes companies
without a direct relationship to the patient on the processing or
use end, like certain business associates and subcontractors.104
101. See Shoaski & Segal, supra note 74; see also James Titcomb, Windows
95 at 20: How Bill Gates’ Software Changed the World, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 24,
2015),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/microsoft/windows/11817065/Twentyyears-ago-Microsoft-launched-Windows-95-changing-the-world.html
(establishing that time period as the first major period of consumerization of
the internet with the advent of Windows 95 (with Internet Explorer) providing
many people with their first taste of internet browsing).
102. See Bell, supra note 75; see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88,
at 1556; see also Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 607–09. Notably,
however, HIPAA’s only enforcement mechanism comes from enforcement by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, lacking a private right of action,
which has left the regulatory and statutory framework open for substantial
criticism in its end efficacy from within the federal government itself and some
sectors of the healthcare legal community. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note
88, at 1556–57.
103. See § 262, 110 Stat. at 2023–28; see Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note
88, at 1556–57.
104. See §§ 261–62, 110 Stat. at 2021–23 (describing health information as
all data created or received by a covered entity and relating to the physical or
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The uniform inclusion of public (e.g. veterans’, Medicare,
and Medicaid) and private (group and individual) health plans—
the primary payer side of the American healthcare model—
covers much of the sensitive information health plans carry that
is distinct from the information health care providers carry,
namely financial information, health questionnaires, crossprovider referrals and diagnostic codes, and the personal
information of covered households.105 Their inclusion is not
overbroad, as recent breaches have aptly demonstrated: health
payers process protected health information that is as
significant as the information processed by the providers in their
network, and the risks of exposure of that information justify
their inclusion in the legislation.106
Moreover,
the
wide
inclusion
of
health
care
clearinghouses—institutions that manage a component of the
health care data processing business, like billing or coding
vendors—serves to protect patient information from disclosure
when working outside the somewhat-direct payer-provider
relationship.107 Requiring data clearinghouses to abide by the
regulations applied to their clients provides incentives for
providers and payers to carefully select vendors to work with
their sensitive client information, and ensures that all phases of
the traditional health care business model are adequately
seeking to protect patient data.108
The current regulation, through HIPAA, of not only the
health care records themselves, but the records relating to
payment and provision of care, recognizes the risks that the
present information model presents to patients.109 The risks of
disclosure of health payer information ancillary to the leaking of
patient health records, such as insurance member and group
IDs, credit card numbers, and routing information, make the
economic pain of an unauthorized release of health information
much worse due to the extensive costs of healthcare benefit and
mental health of an individual or the provision or payment of their care); see
also Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 608.
105. §§ 261–62, 110 Stat. at 2021–23; see supra notes 4, 6, 24 and
accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text; see also infra note 111.
107. See § 262, 110 Stat. at 2021.
108. See Austin Rutherford, Byrne: Closing the Gap Between HIPAA and
Patient Privacy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 212 (2016) (discussing the expansion
of entities subject to HIPAA).
109. See § 262, 110 Stat. at 2022.
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classical financial frauds.110 As financial crimes against
healthcare companies are comparatively difficult to detect in
cases where identity theft is the root cause, the Act’s broad
inclusion of financial information under its ambit of protection
is a response appropriately measured to the risks of financial
data leakage, even in the modern computing era.111
HIPAA’s stringent sanctions serve to provide an
appropriately strong incentive for health care companies to focus
on data security and the privacy of their patients outside of
prior-existing causes of action. The regulations promulgated
under the Act call for severe penalties for failure to comply with
the privacy requirements of HIPAA, with up to $50,000 in
penalties assigned per violation and $1.5 million assigned for
repeat, identical violations during a calendar year.112 The
massive potential for liability for failure to comply with federal
privacy requirements imputed by the Act and its regulations in
this case provide a reasonable penal incentive for companies to
safeguard the privacy of their patients’ information.113 The
flexibility in the regulation for penalty value assignment enables
the Department of Health and Human Services to scale their
assessment of fees to the severity of the breach while providing
enough of a dollar figure amount to facially dissuade companies
from playing loosely with protected information.114
In a world shrinking by the proliferation of big data and the
resulting ability to extrapolate based on a few bits of data, the
combined breadth of regulation and potential severity of
sanctions continue to reflect this changing reality.115 Though
individual health records pose enough of a risk to an individual’s
privacy and financial integrity in isolation, the amalgamation of
data available to providers in the present technological
environment, and, thus, stored en masse on health service
110. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Phuong Tran,
Anthem Data Breach Will Cost Record Fine of $115 Million, PAUBOX (June 26,
2017), https://www.paubox.com/blog/anthem-data-breach-will-cost-115-million
(providing information on liabilities extending out of a HIPAA violation).
112. 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2019).
113. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 622 (describing civil penalties
as “important incentives for proper behavior”).
114. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2017) (providing civil money penalties ranging
from $100 to $50,000 per violation).
115. See, e.g., id.; §§ 261–262, 110 Stat. at 2021–23; see also Rutherford,
supra note 108, at 212–13.
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providers’ and payers’ databases, provides a far greater level of
danger in the event of their release.116 The morass of data now
stored as part of individual health records can easily decode
individuals’ living situations, states and patterns of health, and
financial information, among other data.117
An act amending HIPAA, HITECH, discussed previously,118
began attempts to modernize HIPAA for the digital age where
necessary.119 One such needed modernization was in enacting
breach notification provisions, which struck an appropriate
balance on data protection while comporting with other sectors’
regulations, providing for uniform requirements to protect
consumers.120 Requiring consumers to be notified of breaches,
and perhaps substantial vulnerabilities where a vulnerability
carries substantial risk of breach, within sixty days absent the
presence of a finding from law enforcement officers that
notification would impede a criminal investigation or damage
national security, and to report breaches to the Department of
Health and Human Services for disclosure acknowledges the
aforementioned ballooning data (with the risks and liabilities
contingent on that ballooning) of health providers and payers.121
With the Act recognizing the digitization of data and consequent
compounding of pieces of data into comprehensive, centralized
masses of files, the legislation’s breach notification requirements
enable consumers to be protected from the multiple types of
fraud to which they are now more vulnerable.122 Mandating
disclosure of such breaches requires transparency and
accountability to customers, officials, and the public regarding
the effectiveness of a company’s data security regimen and the
potential for risk in doing business with that company.123

116. See discussion supra Section I.B.
117. See id.
118. See discussion supra Section I.A.
119. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88, at 1556–57.
120. See, e.g., § 13402, 123 Stat. at 261–62; see also Pasquale & Ragone,
supra note 88, at 652 (“The post-HITECH landscape will increasingly balance
these [privacy] concerns with the goals of innovation, access, and cost-control.”).
121. See discussion supra Section I.B; see also Rutherford, supra note 108,
at 212–13.
122. See Rutherford, supra note 108, at 213 (noting that data breaches are
increasingly common over the years).
123. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645 (arguing that intense
surveillance of the data security and privacy system motivates providers to
modernize their practices and increases their productivity).
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Meanwhile, the breach notification requirements enable those
protected consumers to, for instance, monitor their claims
records and financial accounts.124 The Act’s public notice
provisions also serve to cut the vectors for undetected medical
benefit fraud by enabling payers to receive notice of a potential
fraud problem arising out of a breach and implement
countermeasures, saving all customers money through reducing
losses from fraud on that plan.125
B. THE PRESENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK DOES NOT PROPOSE
CONCRETE SOLUTIONS TO THE MODERN APPLICATION SECURITY
CONUNDRUM.
Yet, with the strengths of HIPAA and HITECH noted, the
present legal framework created by the Acts and their
regulations exhaustively swings a punitive stick at the repairing
damage end of the privacy enforcement spectrum.126 While,
through threats of penalties for failures, HIPAA tries to
incentivize adoption of best privacy practices, it relies too heavily
on punitive enforcement methods and voluntary cooperation; it
is all stick and no carrot.127 There is no provision for an adequate
framework for actually improving privacy practices, especially
in the technology realm, despite HITECH’s Part D
amendments.128

124. See id. at 644–45 (noting that educating customers to evaluate whether
security is reasonable is critical).
125. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28 (providing examples of how to
correct mistakes in one’s medical records when medical identity theft occurs);
see also Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26 (reporting that fraud involving the
Medicare program totaled more than $6 billion in the last two years).
126. See generally Rutherford, supra note 108, at 214 (arguing that the
threat of no-cap damages in tort suits would improve compliance by various
entities subject to HIPAA regulation).
127. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2017) (informing that HIPAA is enforced via
civil monetary penalty); Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645 (discussing
the intense pressure the threat of enforcement action has on the industry, but
also discussing, as one of the pitfalls, recalcitrance of cloud vendors due to the
lower levels of enforcement action); Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88, at
1556–57.
128. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 608. See also 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.310 (requiring implementation of policies to prevent, contain, and correct
security violations and perform regular control and risk assessments). The
wording of these regulations leaves much of the control over such requirements,
and with it a large chunk of discretion, with the companies themselves in an
attempt at internalizing regulation while presumably reducing the regulatory
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HIPAA’s use of penalties to incentivize a lack of breaches,
while definitely a necessary component of the legislation, misses
the mark on improving the practices of companies in the health
care industry to prevent breaches from becoming an issue with
such regularity in the first place.129 While certain groups of
measures can be taken to reduce the scope or probability of data
breaches occurring from a weakness in systems or protocols,
securing the underlying systems and constantly assessing and
improving on those roadblocks to theft will prevent the breaches
from occurring, at least in that time frame, in the first place.130
While the present Acts adequately address the post-breach
remediation phase, there is little enforceable coverage of
incentivizing pre-breach activities to prevent breaches from
occurring or limiting their scope for when they do occur.131
C. THE PROPOSED IMPROVING HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ACT OF THE 114TH CONGRESS BEGAN TO ADDRESS
CONCERNS OVER INFORMATION GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICES
BUT FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR ENFORCEABILITY.
The proposed, and ultimately tabled,132 Improving Health
Information Technology Act of 2016 was the first legislative
and administrative burdens of providing for some more specific actions and
processes required of these covered entities.
129. 110 Stat. 1936, 2021–23 (Aug. 21, 1996); 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2017).
130. See discussion supra section I.C.; see generally supra note 8 and
accompanying descriptions of vulnerable cybersecurity practices. The OWASP
guidelines there cited, for instance, outline the vulnerabilities as pathways to
the breaches which cause the problems in the first place. Computers follow a
linear logic, as does the process of pulling information off computers without
authorization (i.e. the breach itself). For a breach to occur, there must be such
a vulnerability.
131. While the Department does, in theory, have auditing authority,
particularly through authority derived from dealings with CMS, the stretched
resources of the Department have already been described as inadequate for
purpose at best per the discussion and citation in Hoffman & Podgurski, supra
note 88, at 1556–57. Regardless, audits remain a tool that, while more proactive
than the remediation and penalty phase enforcement efforts described at length
in this Note, still stems from reacting to a discovery of a problem as opposed to
preventing those problems from occurring through adequate controls. While
audits on those controls would be a good first step, the literature and
discussions within these agencies make clear that this is not a process that can
be improved with regulatory “sticks” and pervasiveness alone. Pasquale &
Ragone, supra note 88, at 645–46.
132. That is to say, set aside for no further consideration in that session or,
thus far, in any further session. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc.
No. 113-18, at 8 (1st Sess. 2013). Laying on the table has the meaning described
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attempt at a partial solution to the conundrum discussed
above.133 Most notably, the Act attempted to implement
standards for IT product design in certifying products for use in
Medicare’s Meaningful Use Incentive program.134
The framework proposed by the Act focuses on the exchange
of health information and voluntary data-sharing arrangements
instead of mandatory standards for national health
technologies.135 Coming out of committee, the Act requires the
Department to merely “encourage” “voluntary certification of
health information technology,” effectively gutting the proposed
Act of any teeth it may have had or needed to ensure that its
aims were met.136 In relegating the standardized, standardsbased star rating system for health IT, which would have drawn
from a multisector, multidisciplinary panel of experts in
assessing, among other qualities, a health IT software package’s
information security and privacy protections, to a partially
voluntary framework under which decertification from
Meaningful Access would be the only real possible penalty and
only under a fixed set of circumstances, the Act ends not far from
where it began: with no real solution to the unregulated health
IT development space and the problems it imports.137
The framework further needlessly segments pediatric and
adult data handling, adding an unnecessary layer of complexity
to the Act.138 The Act provides, without explanation, for different
certification standards and deadlines for various classes of
patient and facility, most notably for practices supporting child
health care.139 This complication is unnecessary: children have
largely the same privacy and data exchange needs and medical
record specifications as adults.140 Providing segmented

as it is a final disposition in the negative on certain substantive and subsidiary
motions which affect consideration of a “main” question or matter before the
Chair.
133. S. 2511, 114th Cong. (2016).
134. Id. § 2(a) at 53 ¶¶ 19–25.
135. See id. § 2(b).
136. Id. at § 2(b) at 56 ¶¶ 1–10.
137. See id.
138. See id. § 2(b) at 56 ¶¶ 17–25; see also id. § 2(b) at 57 ¶¶ 1–8.
139. See id.
140. Cf. Victoria Turk, GDPR Could Have Unintended Consequences for
Teenagers, WIRED (May 23, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/gdprchildren-under-16-parental-consent (emphasizing that GDPR recognizes that
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requirements for various medicinal specialties does not advance
what should be the ultimate aim of the legislation—to provide a
simple but complete framework for securing national healthcare
IT infrastructure.141 Segmenting products by specialty
needlessly complicates the proposed regulatory processes in the
Act and products which would be developed under its purview.
III. SOLUTIONS
A revised form of the proposed 2016 Act to empower the
Secretary to promulgate regulations that secure the national
healthcare technology infrastructure would move many
providers toward compliance, imperfectly remediating many of
the risks of data breaches at providers and payers. These
solutions would balance incentivization with enforcement to
create a program that promotes broad industry buy-in to its
ambit.
A. REFRAME THE 2016 ACT TO ENABLE EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF ACCEPTED BEST SECURITY PRACTICES FOR
THE HANDLING OF SENSITIVE HEALTH INFORMATION
One of the most glaring pitfalls of proposed amendments to
healthcare privacy regulations is their focus on voluntary
associations as the end of the Act’s provisions for ensuring
compliance with best practices for data security in the
industry.142 While any Act certainly should call for voluntary
associations as part of its solutions to the healthcare IT
conundrum in which the nation finds itself, any meaningful
legislation and regulation would necessarily have mechanisms
for enforcement contained inside their text.143
Mandating that all healthcare IT appliances fall under the
ambit of a universal, standardized healthcare IT assessment
framework set by the Department of Health and Human
Services regulators after consultation with all sides of the
children merit specific protection regarding their personal data because they
may be less aware of the risks).
141. See S. 2511, 114th Cong. § 2(a) at 52 ¶¶ 22–25 (2016) (announcing that
the goal of the Act is “the reduction of regulatory or administrative burdens
relating to the use of electronic health records”).
142. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645–46 (describing the
recalcitrance of cloud healthcare actors to act on their own volition due to
limited enforcement with no incentivizing framework separate from that).
143. See id.
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industry, like the framework proposed by the 2016 Act, would
more effectively cover the healthcare IT subsector’s products and
achieve the aims of ensuring healthcare IT security and
preservation of privacy. As HIPAA exemplifies, broadly defining
the reach of regulation in the healthcare information realm best
protects consumers from poor practices relating to their data.144
Placing all healthcare IT under the same assessment umbrella
will enable uniformity of assessment, and thus expectations, of
developed software, enabling a software-producing company to
ingrain developmental best practices into all their healthcare
products, ensuring that all products concerning protected
patient health information are accurately and adequately
evaluated.145 Maintaining a baseline of pre-set minimum
threshold and target-level standards that are continuously
reviewed, and then tracking compliance with their
implementation, would affect the goals of the assessment
framework. Ensuring this evaluation and publicizing the results
as the 2016 Act proposed will increase patient confidence in the
integrity of health technologies and work to protect patient
privacy from the pre-breach, development and implementation
stages, instead of retroactively attempting to put out the fire of
a massive breach.146
To prevent excessive barriers to entry, innovation, and
competition in the healthcare technology space for Meaningful
Use-covered entities, however, any such regulation should
include reasonable provisions allowing for new entrants,
products, and updates to be pushed to market without
undergoing
a
full,
exhaustive
screening
of
their
vulnerabilities.147 A process, for instance, of provisional
accreditation for software that passes basic tests of security
144. Id.
145. For instance, the framework like that found in OWASP, supra note 8,
a) shows certain universal standards are applicable across sectors and
approaches to development as a baseline for best practices, and b) provides an
example of such a best practice regimen, combining enumerated concrete
actions with abstract programming concepts to provide for a blend of
programming flexibility (depending on the use case) and certain baseline
requirements common to virtually every use case. See generally Pasquale &
Ragone, supra note 88, at 625–26.
146. S. 2511; Rutherford, supra note 108, at 212–13; Pasquale & Ragone,
supra note 88, at 620–23.
147. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88, at 1565 (arguing that
regulation that promotes standardization would not necessarily stifle
competition).
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pending a full assessment and rating, will enable new products
to enter the market more efficiently while minimally
compromising the security aims the proposed legislation would
provide.148
Moreover, enabling companies to update their EHR
software without that iteration not being certified would
encourage companies to improve on their software’s design,
features, and security and privacy protections without the
burdens of excessive bureaucratic review.149 A rolling process of
continuous review and improvement would serve this end as
well as ensuring continued compliance with evolving best
practices in the security space.150 Providing for a regimen of
regular review by HHS and re-rating by the evaluation panel of
healthcare technology would balance these interests and
incentivize companies to continuously improve software to
prevent new security holes from plaguing older, deprecating
software.151 Such a program would need to assess the realistic
resource constraints and the burdens created on HHS and other
involved entities, and the Secretary ought to promulgate
regulations that would effectively balance burden with benefit.
Providing for an actual enforcement mechanism for these
rules, such as, at a minimum, decertification from Meaningful
148. See id., at 1570 (discussing the early stages of development of EHR
technologies as opportunities to formulate best practices, and, implicitly, build
on those best practices as the EHR technology develops). Thus, it follows
logically that providing for entry to new technologies would provide the impetus
for new best practices, though with the risk of poor products coming to the
market with lesser regulation, hence the provisional component of any
emerging product accreditation scheme. A middle approach between effectively
walling off the marketplace of EHR software to existing, verified entrants, and
providing for a lack of regulation of these pieces of software, would balance the
two competing interests of security and vitality.
149. See id. at 1565–66 (providing that the regulatory oversight contains a
mechanism for timely approval of innovative user interface features that
conflict with existing guidelines).
150. OWASP, supra note 8, at 19. Regular, but not so regular as to burden
development, testing, and audit teams, code review, especially in light of new
best practices and vulnerabilities, is accepted as a development industry best
practice. See id. at 3. Similarly, reasonably frequent review of software,
especially that published agilely (in short, continuously-updated iterations),
will keep up standards while not burdening each incremental release of
software with a full-fledged external review process, which could potentially
keep out, as in the case with software security patch releases, the very sort of
secure design that the process would, ideally, be intended to reach across the
industry board.
151. See id.
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Use in all cases involving EHR systems (not just on a voluntary
basis) or imputing regulatory and civil liability for breaches to
the software-producing and -using companies, would provide an
adequate deterrence to ensure compliance with the proposed
system.152
B. CONFIRM IN THE ACT A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
BREACHES OF SENSITIVE HEALTHCARE DATA
Enabling consumers to take control of their healthcare data
by granting a federal right of action to those consumers against
companies responsible for the negligent loss of, unauthorized
access to, failure to mitigate a breach of, or lack of notification of
a breach of their HIPAA-protected data would provide an
additional and uniform deterrence to payers, providers, and
software-makers to use properly secured healthcare software in
their businesses, and to react appropriately to data breaches
when they do occur.153 Since no such uniform private right of
action exists under the current federal legal framework,
confirming such a right under federal law would ensure
uniformity of expectation and conformity to regulation.154 It will
also protect patients from losses incurred by poor data security
practices where they would have no other cause or right of
action.155
C. STRENGTHEN PROVISIONS FOR DATA SHARING OF BEST
PRACTICES IN SECURITY BETWEEN VARIOUS PROVIDERS AND
INSURERS
Voluntary sharing of data relating to best practices in
security and privacy of healthcare technology will strengthen
the overall national healthcare security situation.156 The design
152. See Terry, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
153. See Rutherford, supra note 108, at 203 (arguing that giving the harmed
individuals a right of action incentivizes better compliance with HIPAA by
instilling in companies a fear of sizeable damage awards).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See generally OWASP, supra note 8. These voluntary data sharing
organizations would need to implement adequate internal safeguards for
ensuring that any dangerous data being discussed has a minimal risk of leaking
to outsiders who would thwart the whole security purpose of these data sharing
associations and groups. However, making this process a national security
clearance-level accreditation or screening may prove restrictive. Since these
associations would be voluntary, it would likely fall to the voluntarily-
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of such a voluntary data sharing program would, ideally, involve
the creation of an informal national panel of multiple subjectmatter experts in a variety of healthcare technology institutions,
including providers, payers, and producers advising the
Department of Health and Human Services and each other on
technical and administrative procedures, development
techniques, policies, and design principles to secure national
healthcare technologies.157 Promoting this form of public-private
and private-private partnership will foster communication
between all involved parties, increasing an atmosphere of trust
and collaboration already implicitly anticipated under the 2016
Act’s
proposed
interoperability
requirements.158
The
information shared here would not create a standard of care or
minimum expectation on healthcare technology providers and
users, but would serve to strengthen the best practices in the
industry, creating an environment where all participants’
products are able to progress in this area.159

associating organizations and the DHS to determine these standards reflexively
based on their perceived risks, needs, costs, and opportunities.
157. There is precedent for national security-related information technology
security voluntary data sharing, such as via the Department of Homeland
Security’s Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, groups with
members voluntarily sharing information with one another. Information
Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/isao (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). Indeed, this proposal is
similar to those programs with much the same intent but designed to be formed
specifically within the healthcare sector and among healthcare sector lines as
would involve a broader group of stakeholders, and outside the more stringent
national security clearance process as ISAOs are subjected to in determining
members and information to be shared. This would reach in scope beyond only
national security applications despite its implications for national security.
158. See id.
159. But see Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645 (calling for a more
mandatory approach, with best practices from any reasonable source absolutely
mandated). The danger in a total approach is that it may stifle discussion of
these best practices while constraining individualized development approaches.
The idea is to create a strong minimum standard in the solution discussed
relating to enforcement of best practices, discussed supra section III.A, but also
to create a working group where practices can be shared such that there is a
free exchange of ideas while recognizing the difference in situations between
the various entities represented—that is, what works for one person at that
particular table will not necessarily work for another given variation in use
case, development, and architecture. The Secretary could then promulgate
regulations enforcing the recommendations or outcomes of discussions of that
panel.
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D. CONFIRM THE SECURITY OF MEDICAL RECORDS AS A
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURAL SECURITY PRIORITY
Finally, a responsive legislative act would confirm that
medical record security is a national security priority. Though
the Department of Homeland Security confirms IT and
healthcare as critical national infrastructure, its discussion
documents fail to outline the nexus between IT and healthcare
specifically, instead focusing on the system availability of
patient care infrastructure and health IT.160 Considering the
potential reach of medical records into the lives of everyday
people and the harms visited upon customers in the event of
their undue breach, the declaration of medical security as a
component of national security is not a stretch of logic.161 At a
minimum, ensuring patients’ financial security while protecting
the medical payer systems from fraud constitutes a substantial
enough economic risk and benefit calculation to consider
healthcare technology as a component of important national
infrastructure. Moreover, protecting the privacy of individuals
and their medical encounters, as well as those of their families,
prevents domestic and international opportunists from preying
on Americans.162
In the spirit of enshrining medical records as a matter of
infrastructural security, an ideal Act would adopt at least shortterm grant provisions for ensuring the continued security of the
nation’s medical infrastructure, particularly patient portals’
public-facing infrastructure as the most vulnerable link,
addressing the concerns discussed over the “stick-only” approach
currently taken to healthcare security.163 Creating a program for
competitive and need-based grants to improve medical records

160. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Apr. 1, 2016);
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., HEALTHCARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SECTORSPECIFIC PLAN 1–4 (2016). However, the DHS does recommend that healthcare
IT be strengthened from a national security standpoint through
implementation of improvements to private-sector information sharing,
specifically through the ISAO, as this note also suggests. HEALTHCARE AND
PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLAN, at 46; Exec. Order No. 13,691, 3 C.F.R.
§ 13691 (2015).
161. See discussion supra section I.B.
162. See, e.g., Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26 (reporting that Chinese
hackers allegedly had broken into one of the largest U.S. hospital operators’
computer network and stolen the personal information of 4.5 million patients).
163. See discussion supra section II.B.
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software security would provide a positive incentive for product
developers to create adequately secure products for use in the
nation’s payer and provider systems.164 Ideally, this grant
program would apply broadly, enabling grants to be used for
secure systems development, secure systems implementation,
and continuous operational security in live production
environments, so as to address all major areas of vulnerability
in the healthcare IT execution waterfall.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent, massive data breaches of patient portals in this
country have revealed areas for improvement in the nation’s
current piece-meal and overly focused healthcare technology
regulatory framework. The relatively recent advent of patient
portals as a commonplace technology, joined with the vast
amounts of data stored on them and the permanently-evolving
threat and risk environment surrounding digital information,
particularly in the healthcare industry, reveals shortcomings in
the dated provisions of HIPAA and HITECH. By adopting a
public, transparent, rigorous, standards-based approach to
assessing and approving healthcare software products for use,
in addition to incentivizing proper developmental and prebreach practices instead of merely punishing poor security after
a breach of health records, the country will be able to adopt
scientific, uniform, and measurable healthcare IT standards and
requirements to ensure the protection of its patient health and
financial data with sufficient flexibility to meet the needs of the
foreseeable future of healthcare technology.

164. See discussion supra section III.A.

